Peter Black

**Odilo Globocnik, Nazi Eastern Policy, and the Implementation of the Final Solution**

During the spring of 1943, while on an inspection tour of occupied Poland that included a briefing on the annihilation of the Polish Jews, SS Personnel Main Office chief Maximilian von Herff characterized Lublin District SS and Police Leader and SS-*Gruppenführer* Odilo Globocnik, in the following way: “A man fully charged with all possible light and dark sides. Little concerned with appearances, fanatically obsessed with the task, [he] engages himself to the limit without concern for health or superficial recognition. His energy drives him often to breach existing boundaries and to forget the boundaries established for him within the [SS-] Order – not out of personal ambition, but much more for the sake of his obsession with the matter at hand. His success speaks unconditionally for him.”

Von Herff’s analysis of Globocnik’s reflected a consistent pattern in the career of the Nazi Party organizer and SS officer, who characteristically atoned for his transgressions of the National Socialist code of behavior by fanatical pursuit and implementation of core Nazi goals.

Globocnik was born to Austro-Croat parents on April 21, 1904 in multinational Trieste, then the principal seaport of the Habsburg Monarchy. His father’s family had come from Neumarkt (Tržič), in Slovenia. Franz Globocnik served as a Habsburg cavalry lieutenant and later a senior postal official; he died of pneumonia on December 1, 1919. Globocnik’s paternal grandfather had been a

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1 Evaluation memorandum of SS-Gruppenführer von Herff, no date [May 1943], O. Globocnik SS Officer file, RG-242 (former Berlin Document Center – BDC), SSO3343, Roll 016A, frame 950, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter: NARA).

Gymnasium professor in Ljubljana; his great-grandfather a physician, who had taken part in the Austrian campaign against Napoleon in 1809. Globocnik’s mother, Anna Petschinka, had been born in Vršac (Werschetz), in the Serbian Banat. She was the daughter of a government auditor. Globocnik’s ancestral heritage is therefore not entirely clear. He was of partial Slovene, Croat and possibly Serb descent, though both grandmothers bore German names. Franz Globocnik considered himself a German and insisted that his son Odilo and his two sisters (Lydia and Erika) speak German in the home. There is no evidence presently available that would indicate that Globocnik was troubled by his ancestry – he made no effort to Germanize his name – or that the issue was raised by any of his many enemies. Yet his later zeal may have reflected the psychology of a borderland German born in a multinational state who needed to prove to himself and others that his commitment to the cause was pure.

After six years of elementary school in Trieste, where he learned to speak Italian, young Globocnik entered a military boarding school in St. Pölten in Lower Austria in December 1915. By this time, his family had moved to the Carinthian capital of Klagenfurt. Globocnik’s education for an officer’s career ended abruptly with the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy and the establishment of the new Austrian Republic in the autumn and winter of 1918–1919. He moved in with his family in Klagenfurt and attended the vocational high school; he graduated on July 11, 1923 as a certified machinist. After securing a position in the Klagenfurt municipal electricity works in 1923, Globocnik was sent on the road as a construction foreman at various water power plants throughout Carinthia. He returned to Klagenfurt in 1930.

Globocnik later claimed to have joined one of the numerous Heimatschutz units formed more or less spontaneously to defend the Klagenfurt basin against the incursion of South Slav troops between 1918 and 1920. Given his youth, his involvement may have been minimal, but one cannot exclude the possibility that the teen took up arms or ran courier services. For reasons that are unclear but which may have related to intra-Party factionalism, Globocnik did not formally join the NSDAP until March 1, 1931.

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3 SS-Erbgesundheitsbogen, signed Globocnik, October 15, 1941, O. Globocnik RuSHA file, NARA; Pucher, Bewegung, pp. 16–17, 20; Porprzeczny, Globocnik, pp. 9–19.
4 Pucher, Bewegung, pp. 18–23.
5 Ibid., p. 19; Porprzeczny, Globocnik, pp. 23–25.
6 SS Officer Card, O. Globocnik SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), SS03343/016A/922-923, NARA; Questionnaire for Application to the National Socialist Party, signed Globocnik, May 20, 1938, RG-242, 298BBX, frames 20496–20497, NARA.
Foreign contacts in his native Trieste strengthened Globocnik’s position in the Carinthian Nazi Party organization. From 1930 until 1933, Globocnik had served as the cell organizer and propaganda leader in the National Social Factory Cell Organization (*NS-Betriebszellenorganisation*) in Klagenfurt. After Austrian Federal Chancellor Dollfuß banned the Nazi Party on May 19, 1933, Globocnik established an effective courier and intelligence service operating out of Klagenfurt and Trieste. Importing illegal funds from Munich through a circuitous route involving a chambermaid in Interlaken and three import-export firms based in Mailand and Padua, he exported intelligence data on political organization and activities in Austria. These services won the admiration of his mentor, Carinthian *Gauleiter* Hubert Klausner, and of his colleague and close friend, Friedrich Rainer, and received the attention of Reich Security Service (*Sicherheitsdienst* – SD) chief Reinhard Heydrich, who brought Globocnik into the SS on September 1, 1934.

Hitler’s orders banning Reich German interference in Austrian affairs after the botched National Socialist putsch of July 1934 induced Globocnik and Rainer, as Klausner’s deputies, to develop a new political response to Dollfuß’s Christian Social successor, Kurt von Schuschnigg. Rejecting politically unfocused terror, the Carinthian *Gau* leadership also opposed passive forbearance in hope of a future Anschluß. As Rainer later explained it, he and Globocnik advocated the transformation of the illegal NSDAP into a cadre party focused on reconstruction of the shattered formations, ideological training, and maintenance of both an underground press and an effective intelligence service. Despite four arrests and a total of 323 days in prison between September 1933 and November 1935, Globocnik traveled between Vienna, Munich, Klagenfurt and Budapest establishing clandestine press and propaganda stations and bartering information for relief funds.

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8 SS Officer’s Card, O. Globocnik SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), 3343A, roll 016A, frames 922–923, NARA.

9 Speech of Friedrich Rainer, Klagenfurt, March 11, 1942, RG-242, 4005-PS, published in International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals (Nuremberg, Germany: 1947--hereafter: IMT), XXXIV, pp. 6–8, 11, 14. Rainer later boasted that „Globus [Globocnik] was on the move throughout Europe at that time.” From January to October 1935, Globocnik traveled to Munich no less than seven times. For a brief period in 1935, he even ran the entire underground NSDAP operation in
To ease administrative and police pressure and thus create opportunities to strengthen the illegal organization and disseminate Nazi propaganda, the Carinthian Gau leadership sought contacts with the Schuschnigg government through individuals, who, though Nazi sympathizers committed to the Anschluß, had kept their distance from the illegal organization, disdained violence, and were willing to meet Schuschnigg’s one non-negotiable demand: recognition of the Austrian state. Personified by the Viennese lawyer, Arthur Seyß-Inquart, such individuals could conduct negotiations without compromising the illegal Party or being compromised by it. After pledging Germany to refrain from interference in internal Austrian affairs by signing the Austro-German agreement of July 11, 1936, Hitler personally ordered Globocnik and Rainer to be patient, to trust in Seyß-Inquart, and to refrain from illegal activity.10

Despite his youth and low seniority in the Party, Globocnik used his contacts with Heydrich in Berlin and with the rising Austrian SS leader Ernst Kaltenbrunner in Linz to win Hitler and Göring over to Seyß-Inquart’s candidacy as spokesman for the Nazi idea in Austria. Though the old guard, represented by Lower Austrian Gauleiter Josef Leopold, removed Globocnik from his Party positions and expelled him from the Party, the Carinthian Nazi leadership eventually triumphed with Hitler’s appointment of Klausner to replace Leopold as leader of the Austrian underground Nazi organization on February 21, 1938.11 When Seyß-Inquart became Minister of the Interior that month, Globocnik and Rainer used the illegal apparatus, which they now controlled, to organize public demonstrations of Nazi strength and confidence, goading Schuschnigg to opt for the ill-fated plebiscite that precipitated the Anschluß.

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10 In 1942, Rainer spoke candidly of Globocnik’s heated argument with Hitler over the continued distribution of relief funds and propaganda material. See Rainer Speech, March 11, 1942, 4005-PS, IMT XXXIV, pp. 16–17. See also unsigned memorandum [internal evidence indicates Globocnik as the author; hereafter: Globocnik Memo], May 1938, RG-242, T-84/16/44257, NARA. For Globocnik’s own comments on the Carinthian strategy and his assessment of Seyß-Inquart, see ibid., 44252-44254.

11 On Globocnik’s tensions with Leopold, see letter from Leopold to Hitler, August 22, 1937, RG-238, NG-3578, NARA; Globocnik Memo, T-84/16/44255-44256, NARA. On Globocnik’s expulsion from the Party and Kaltenbrunner’s protection, see letter from Kaltenbrunner to Keppler, September 3, 1937, RG-242, T-120/751/34486-344887, NARA. For literature, see Bruce F. Pauley, Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis: A History of Austrian National Socialism, Chapel Hill 1981.
Given his key role in developing an image for Seyß-Inquart in Berlin and facilitating the Nazi takeover in Austria, Globocnik was satisfied neither with the Anschluß nor his own personal reward. As early as December 1937, Rainer had had to apologize to Seyß-Inquart for Globocnik’s “aggressive personal tactics,” after Seyß had refused to appoint him to a team of negotiators that would meet with Schuschnigg. When Seyß then ignored both Rainer and Globocnik during and after the Nazi takeover, Globocnik composed a memorandum in which he glorified his and Rainer’s role in the events and argued that: “The breakthrough in the struggle of National Socialism does not lie in the modification of borders […] but in the success of the National Socialist will; and with that the seizure of power in a state [i.e. Austria], which […] then in its actions spontaneously carries out […] tasks for the entire nation, aligned with the leadership of the entire nation, [but] regardless of whether this part of the nation lives within or outside of the primary state of the entire nation.”

Globocnik presented his memorandum to Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Heß, in Berlin, but ultimately had to accept the advice of the more practical Rainer – to “accept things as they are and to seek new, productive options in the Party.”

On Klausner’s recommendation, Josef Bürckel, whom Hitler had entrusted with the task of “reunifying” Austria with the Reich, appointed Globocnik Gauleiter of Vienna in May 1938.

Lacking standing in the municipal Party organization and dependent upon Bürckel for support, Globocnik nearly ended his career in Vienna by boasting arrogantly, making vague threats against unnamed enemies, and applying an imaginative approach to problem-solving that led him into shady manipulation of confiscated funds and property. Within six months, the new Gauleiter had alienated even his few allies in the city.

When funding for various grandiose and often foolhardy projects was denied by the tightly centralized Party Treasury in Munich under Franz Xavier Schwarz, Globocnik boasted that “he would soon find appropriate means to get

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12 Globocnik Memo, May 1938, T-84/16/44251, NARA.
13 Letter from Rainer to Bürckel, July 6, 1939, 812-PS, IMT XXVI, p. 348.
14 Bürckel appears to have ignored the recommendations of some on his staff that it would have been „absolutely good“ if Globocnik were to „work for a time in the central office [in Munich] of the Party.“ See Memorandum for Gauleiter Bürckel, signed Opdenhoff, April 2, 1938, RG-242, T-580/62/Ordner 304 II, NARA.
the money.”

Such means included dubious slush funds, loans from Bürckel’s office, proceeds from confiscated property, looting from Aryanization measures, and unauthorized advances from central Nazi Party funds. Globocnik used the funding to build sinecures into the Vienna Gau organization, float interest-free loans to cronies and “deserving” comrades from the underground years, initiate construction projects that lacked firm completion plans, support failing Nazi publishing houses, and purchase buildings at inflated prices. In September 1938, Schwarz’s representative in Vienna warned that this “uncontrolled financial policy” had brought the Vienna Gau organization to the brink of “complete bankruptcy.” When Bürckel, threatened with the suspension of funding to all Austrian Gaue, ordered Globocnik to account for his expenditures, Globocnik sensed the inevitable and, failing to induce Himmler to intervene, resigned on January 30, 1939.

After banishing him to the Regiment “Der Führer,” where a physician noted that he suffered from “nervous insomnia,” Himmler appointed Globocnik SS and Police Leader (SS- und Polizeiführer – SSPF) for the Lublin District of the Government General in occupied Poland on November 1, 1939. Relieved and ecstatic, Globocnik wired his assurance to Himmler that the SSPF in Lublin would “devote all resources to be little helpers for you at our positions.”

The Lublin District of the Government General formed a geographical, ideological, and strategic center for the implementation of a long-term core National Socialist goal: to conquer by military force and render suitable for German settlement “living space” from the eastern borders of the Reich to the Ural Mountains. Guided by a pre-war general consensus, identified by Gerhard Weinberg in 1980, the Nazis intended to secure the newly conquered territories for German settlement by eliminating or intellectually decapitating those peoples whom they perceived to be of “alien” and “inferior” race, leaving behind a “residue” to provide manual labor. Himmler’s appointment as Reich Commissar

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17 Meiler to Saupert [Staff Manager for the Reich Treasury Supervisor of the Nazi Party], September 2, 1938, RG-242, T-580/61/Ordner 303, NARA.

18 Order No. 36/39, January 30, 1939, RG-242, T-580/548/Ordner 659, NARA.

19 Certificate of Garrison Physician / SS Special Service Troops, June 7, 1939, O. Globocnik SS Officer file (former BDC), SSO3343/016A/952, NARA. One week earlier Himmler had advised Globocnik to take three weeks vacation near a lake. See Himmler to Globocnik, May 31, 1939, ibid., frame 1267.


for the Fortification of German Ethnicity (*Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums* – RKFDV) on October 7, 1939 established his SS and police as the primary executive apparatus for this “racial restructuring of Eastern Europe,” of which the elimination of the Jewish population formed “an integral part.”

Given temporary Nazi plans to concentrate their Jewish residents of the German Reich and of the annexed territories of western Poland, the position of SS and Police Leader in District Lublin attained strategic significance beyond the region’s weak economic promise. The district also formed the strategic heart of the easternmost extension of the Government General abutting on Soviet territory. As such, the Government General and particularly District Lublin became laboratories for the development of Nazi racial policy.

From the day of Globocnik’s appointment, SS and civilian occupation authorities joined a bitter conflict in three areas vital to the implementation of long-term racial aims: the resettlement of populations, mass shootings, and the establishment of police authority. None of this conflict had significant ideological content; it involved timing, coordination, jurisdiction, and control over police personnel. For the key position of SSPF in District Lublin, Himmler needed a man who combined ideological fanaticism, relentless energy, and imagination to find or invent means to achieve radical goals despite bureaucratic obstacles. Since, as von Herff was later to observe, Globocnik possessed these qualities, he was an ideal executor of Himmler’s ideological will in the East, and a prime example of the “nobility of achievement” that the SS was supposed to represent.

In 1939, the SS had the potential but not yet the undisputed power to control racial policy in the Government General, even policy aimed specifically against the Jews. Committed to wage what Hitler referred to as a “ruthless national struggle that permitted no legal restraints” against virtually the entire population, the SS and police apparatus vied with army generals, civilian administrators, and German industrialists for power and influence. A key source of conflict

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24 Musial, Zivilverwaltung, pp. 28–29.

was control over available human resources to implement occupation policies that were by definition unpopular. For example, there were assigned to District Lublin between 1,600 and 1,900 civilian employees (including chauffeurs, porters, and clerical support personnel), between 500 and 600 Security Police and SD officials (more than 2/3 of whom were stationed in Lublin), 441 permanently stationed German gendarmes, two small detachments of Municipal Order Police in Lublin and Chełm and 1,315 Polish police officials.\(^{26}\) Since the fulcrum of executive power, whether military or police, was concentrated in the cities of the Government General, the successful implementer of policy required a reliable and ruthlessly trained cadre of auxiliaries prepared to go into the countryside in force.

Another key source of jurisdictional conflict related to policy implementation against the Jewish population of the Government General. Between 250,000 and 320,000 Jews resided in District Lublin between 1939 and 1942, some 47,000 of them in Lublin and 16,000 in Chełm.\(^{27}\) The Jews represented initially a resource both for cheap labor and for moveable and immovable assets. Even as the Germans were conquering Poland, the SS sought exclusive control over the Jewish communities. On September 21, 1939, Security Police chief Reinhard Heydrich ordered his Einsatzgruppen commanders to establish Jewish Councils, made up of leading Jewish citizens, which would be responsible for carrying out German orders and through which roving Security Police and SD units would coordinate their efforts to concentrate Jews in the larger cities of the to-be-created Government General.\(^{28}\) The civilian authorities made their play for control over the Jewish communities with Governor General Hans Frank’s decrees establishing Jewish councils, requiring Jews to perform compulsory labor, and obligating Jews to register their property.\(^{29}\) Under Globocnik’s leadership the SS

\(^{26}\) Pohl, Judenmord, pp. 38–39. Figures offered more recently for persons employed by the Office of the Governor of District Lublin specifically and for the persons employed in all counties within the five districts of the Government General would indicate that in 1942, the District in fact had perhaps 1,000 Reich German and ethnic German employees. See Musial, Zivilverwaltung, p. 87. This figure would not include German employees of central agencies such as the Ostbahn, the Reichspost, and the German military.

\(^{27}\) Musial, Zivilverwaltung, pp. 102–103. See also Pohl, Judenmord, p. 63.

\(^{28}\) Secret decree from Heydrich to Einsatzgruppen Commanders, September 21, 1939, RG-242, T-501/230/18-23, NARA.

\(^{29}\) Decree on the Establishment of Jewish Councils, signed Frank, November 28, 1939, Verordnungsblatt des Generalgouverneurs für die besetzten Ostgebiete (hereafter cited as: VOBiGG), 1939, pp. 72–73, Library of Congress (hereafter: LC); decree on the Introduction of Forced Labor for the Jewish Population of the Government General, signed Frank, October 26, 1939, VOBi. GG, No. 1, October 26, 1939,
and Police authorities in Lublin sought to regain control over the Jews by deploying an armed auxiliary police force, recruited primarily from the fragmented ethnic German populations living on countryside, particularly in the vicinity of Chełm. From these recruits, Globocnik and his staff fashioned the Selbstschutz (literally “self-defense”) into an auxiliary police battalion stationed in Lublin, but capable of being deployed in force anywhere in the district where executive muscle was required to enforce the regulations of the German occupation authorities.30

Globocnik did not invent the idea to recruit auxiliary police among local ethnic Germans. On the day of his appointment as RKFDV, Himmler had authorized the German Order Police headquarters to establish locally based Selbstschutz units in the annexed western territories of Poland. For the Government General, he appointed an SS and Selbstschutz commander, subordinate to the Higher SS and Police Leader (Höherer SS und Polizeiführer – HSSPF) for the Government General, SS-Obergruppenführer Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger.31 Between November 1939 and April 1940, some 12,600 ethnic German men were recruited into Selbstschutz units under command of the SSPF for each of the four districts of the Government General. As Krüger explained to police and civilian authorities in Kraków on April 23, 1940, the Selbstschutz was designated “for all possible tasks in the area” and was “deployed where SS and police are for all practical purposes not available […]”32

30 Black, Rehearsal, passim.
Recruited and barracked in four district capitals of the Government General, the mobile Selbstschutz units generally remained under the strict supervision and discipline of the district commanders of the Order Police (Kommandeure der Ordnungspolizei – KdO). Only in District Lublin did Globocnik retain direct control over the unit, utilizing it more or less as a private police force. The significance of the Lublin Selbstschutz is threefold; its history (1) reflected the bitter struggle between SS-police and civilian authorities over scarce manpower resources and police power at the local level in the Government General; (2) underscored the first, albeit botched attempt, of the SS and police to gain exclusive control over all Jews and some Poles in the Government General; and (3) demonstrated that under ruthless and ideologically committed leadership, raw recruits, equipped at the most with a cultural attachment to Germany, could be fashioned into an efficient machine for Nazi population policy, including mass murder. That Globocnik’s experiment with the Selbstschutz in Lublin failed in 1940 is in part an indication that the SS did not yet command the power to implement the ideological aims of the Nazi regime outside the bureaucratic constrictions imposed by the management of an occupation regime.\(^{33}\)

Under the leadership of the SS and Selbstschutz commander for the Lublin District, SS-Standartenführer Walter Gunst, SS and police authorities established by mid-December a Selbstschutz battalion with five uniformed companies. Including non-commissioned officers, training personnel, and staff, the total strength of the battalion fluctuated between 800 and 1000 men.\(^{34}\) The recruits were generally young, overwhelmingly Lutheran, and engaged in agriculture by profession. Many came from families that had been deported to Siberia by the Tsarist government during the First World War; nearly 10% of the recruits were actually born in Siberia.\(^{35}\)

With the Selbstschutz as armed support, Globocnik sought to usurp for the SS and police control over policy towards the Jews of Lublin District. As one historian has maintained, Globocnik “subordinated all Jewish matters [in the district] to himself […] and clearly strove to seize all Jewish property and the

\(^{33}\) Black, Rehearsal, p. 208.

\(^{34}\) Krüger to Gunst, November 14, 1939, W. Gunst SS Officer file (former BDC), RGp-242, A3343/SSO/043A/321, NARA; judgment in proceedings against Friedrich Paulus, May 26, 1977, p. 6, file 4 Ks 1/74, State Prosecutor’s Office in Frankfurt am Main. An SS officer, Paulus is not to be confused with the field marshal who commanded the German 6th Army at Stalingrad. This figure does not include the civilian Selbstschutz units that the SS established in the villages where the recruits lived.

product from their [i.e., that of the Jews] forced labor.”  

To implement Frank’s decree on the registration of Jewish property, Gunst sent labor gangs of Lublin Jews under Selbstschutz guard to strip Jewish homes and businesses of movable goods and assets and to transport them to Selbstschutz headquarters on Chopin Street. From this location, Gunst ran a booming illicit trade, selling “anything of any value, including entire bedroom sets and room furnishings.”  

Even after Gunst’s departure to District Warsaw in February 1940, civilian authorities in Lublin reported into the summer of 1940 that the Selbstschutz was guilty of “repeated excesses, including the confiscation of money and commodities.”  

In theory, the deployment of Jewish labor was the responsibility of the German Labor Office officials and coordinated on the local level by the Kreis- and Stadthauptmänner; in practice, officials backed by armed force often seized Jews out of their homes, off the street and even from the worksites of their rivals.  

Taking advantage of these conditions Globocnik established a string of workshops on a field in Lublin’s Lipowa Street, just behind Selbstschutz headquarters on Chopin Street. The Selbstschutz administered and the guarded this so-called Lipowa Lager, and the Jewish Council financed it.  

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37 Interrogation of J.O., February 26, 1964, Proceedings against Friedrich Paulus et al. (hereafter: Paulus Proceedings), Vol. 2, p. 338, State Prosecutor’s Office in Frankfurt. Gunst’s superior, SS-Oberführer Gustav Stolle, no doubt alluded to such dealings when he referred in a service evaluation to Gunst’s propensity to “resort to means that could not be sanctioned by higher-level agencies.” Service evaluation for Walter Gunst, signed Stolle, July 17, 1940, W. Gunst SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), A3343/SSO/043A, NARA.  
38 Kreishauptmann Janów to the Office of the Governor General, June 7, 1940, Proceedings against Josef Bühler (hereafter: Bühler Trial), NTN 272, pp. 117–118, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej (Institute for National Memory), Warsaw (hereafter: IPN). See also report of the District Governor of Lublin, Zörner, to the Office of the Governor General, July 3, 1940, Bühler Trial, NTN, 273, p. 73, IPN.  
39 Each district of the Government General was sub-divided into smaller districts, called Kreise. The local administrative unit was called the Kreishauptmannschaft and the chief administrator was known as the Kreishauptmann. For the larger cities, the administrative unit (for instance, Lublin and Chełm) was known as the Stadthauptmannschaft and the administrator as the Stadthauptmann. To avoid confusion, I will refer to these positions and administrations by their German terms.  
40 Musial, Zivilverwaltung, p. 116.  
While Globocnik operated on his own timetable and with his own methods, he did not act out of concert with Himmler’s general plans for the exploitation of Jewish labor. On January 30, 1940, Security Police Chief Reinhard Heydrich told a gathering of SS, SD and police officials of his intention to deploy, under SS and police supervision, thousands of male Jews at hard labor. A week later, Himmler discussed with Colonel General Walther Brauchitsch, the commander in chief of the army, plans to compel all male Jews to work on border fortifications in eastern Poland. As early as December 8, 1939, Globocnik’s staffers encouraged Wehrmacht representatives to seek laborers for military construction projects not from the civilian labor offices, but directly from the SSPF. Globocnik’s men announced that in the future the tasks of the Selbstschutz in Lublin would involve the “registration […] and supervision of hundreds of thousands of Jews” who would be “concentrated in forced labor camps” to facilitate the provision of labor for road construction and river regulation sites. In order to handle requests for labor and to coordinate his Jewish labor policy at one station, Globocnik established a “Jewish desk” (Judenreferat) on his staff under SS-Obersturmführer Dr. Karl Hofbauer.

In a meeting with district civilian officials on April 22, 1940, Globocnik announced that the Selbstschutz would “take over […] planning in the area of forced labor,” which meant that Selbstschutz units would henceforth officially round up Jewish labor. He proposed to house Jewish workers in camps financed by the Jewish Council in Lublin and named an officer on his staff, SS-Standartenführer Willi Stemmler, the “responsible commander for the deployment of the Jews,” in which capacity he would command the Selbstschutz guard detachments in the proposed labor camps. Eventually, the Selbstschutz would guard and supervise the labor of 2,700 Jews in six camps working on river regulation projects along the Bug River under contract for the Water Economy Inspectorate (Wasserwirtschaftsinspektion) for Kreis Biała-Podlaska alone. Altogether, the SS and Selbstschutz under Stemmler’s leadership guarded at least twenty camps throughout Lublin District and were deployed to round up laborers

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43 [Orts-]Kommandantur I/524 to Department I [Deployment Security], Excerpt From the Memorandum on the Conversation with Police Commanders at Army Headquarters XXXII on December 8, 1939, December 10, 1939, file Ortskommandantur I/524, sygn. 31, pp. 378–379, WAPL; Globocnik to Chief, District Lublin, February 13, 1940, file Gouverneur, Distrikt Lublin, sygn. 891, p. 10, WAPL.
for them. Indeed, when the director of the Biała-Podlaska labor office learned of the impending dissolution of the Selbstschutz, he queried his superiors in Lublin as to “how to guarantee in the future that the Jews would be guarded and selected for forced labor.”

Globocnik’s pet project for Jewish labor was the ill-conceived border fortifications project referred to by Heydrich as early as January 1940. By early spring, SS and police authorities in Lublin had chosen the village of Bełżec (Kreis Zamość), located eight miles from the Nazi-Soviet demarcation line, as the central location for a series of camps to house Jewish laborers deployed in the excavation of anti-tank ditches along that part of the demarcation line not marked by the Bug River.

The first prisoners to arrive at Bełżec, between May 22 and May 24, 1940, were approximately 1,140 Gypsies from Hamburg and Bremen. A transport of Jews from Lublin followed within a week. In early August, three subsidiary camps were established to accommodate the influx of Jews conscripted for labor from Radom, Kraków, and Warsaw districts. In September, the Jewish Council in Lublin reported the presence of more than 11,000 Jewish laborers in the border camps. Selbstschutz units guarded the border fortifications camps and worksites from May 1940 until the civilian authorities secured their dissolution in October. What was constructed before the project was scrapped was rendered superfluous by Hitler’s signature on the operational order of December 18, 1940 to attack the Soviet Union and did nothing to hinder the Soviet advance into Lublin District in the summer of 1944. The closing report of the Jewish Council in Lublin, which bore financial responsibility for feeding and housing the prisoners, estimated that 300 persons died during the course of the project.

Given Globocnik’s praise for the project manager’s work despite “absolutely inadequate construction tools

45 Service evaluation for Willi Stemmler, August 10, 1940, W. Stemmler SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), A3343/SSO, 0156B/242-243, NARA; Labor Office, Biała-Podlaska to Labor Department, Lublin, July 18, 1940, file Gouverneur, District Lublin, sygn. 746, pp. 41–43, WAPL.

46 Recommendations for War Meritorious Service Cross with Swords, signed Globocnik, November 30, 1940, Zbiór wniosków na odznaczenia/file SSPF Lublin, VII/1, pp. 9–17, IPN; Globocnik to Higher SS and Police Leader East, August 13, 1940, H. Dolp SS officer file, NARA; report of Kreishauptmann Zamość in Situation Reports of the Kreis- and Stadthauptleute for May 1940, June 17, 1940, Bühler Trial, NTN 269, p. 148, IPN. Black, Rehearsal, p. 215.

47 Cable from Commander of Order Police in Cracow [signed Major Ragger] to Government General, Office of Population and Welfare, May 18, 1940, file Gouverneur, District Lublin, sygn. 203, p. 4, WAPL; memorandum of Damrau, no date [July 18 or July 19, 1940], file Gouverneur, District Lublin, sygn. 63, p. 26, WAPL.

48 For further details on camps and conditions, see Black, Rehearsal, pp. 215–218.
and poor human material,” it would appear that the SS and Selbstschutz leadership valued the humiliation and torture of the laborers more than the results of the labor itself. Politically, however, the project supported the aim of the SS and police to control the deployment of Jewish labor in the Government General.

Not surprisingly, this high-handedness outraged the civilian authorities in Lublin. Soliciting the support of Globocnik’s superior, HSSPF Krüger, they induced the chief of the Labor Department of the Government General in Kraków, Dr. Max Frauendorfer, to order, on July 5, 1940, the transfer of all matters pertaining to Jewish labor to the jurisdiction of the civilian labor offices: independent actions of other agencies were “not to be tolerated in the future.”

Globocnik also deployed the Selbstschutz in minor population movements based on his own initiatives. In early May 1940, he ordered the destruction of the so-called small ghetto, a mixed Polish-Jewish neighborhood in west Lublin, reportedly because he was “not pleased to have a Jewish settlement in the vicinity of his staff headquarters.”

Teams of security police officials and selected Selbstschutz recruits, operating within a moving cordon of Selbstschutz units, in anticipation of later more deadly ghetto deportation operations, broke into the homes of Jews, forced them out onto the street and transported them by truck or on foot to the newly established Majdan-Tatarski suburb of Lublin. SS and Selbstschutz men shot at least eight Jews during the operation, including an elderly, blind woman. They also engaged in characteristic plunder: a widow with seven children later pleaded with the SS and Selbstschutz headquarters to return three milking cows that had been confiscated and which were her only means of income.

The Selbstschutz also participated independently in punitive reprisal operations under Globocnik’s direction. In April 1940, at Globocnik’s insistence, Selbstschutz men murdered more than 150 civilians and torched 27 farms in Józefów (Kreis Radzyń) in retaliation for the murder of five ethnic German residents of the village. Despite the protests of his superiors in Kraków (Krüger

49 Globocnik to HSSPF, August 13, 1940, H. Dolp SS Officer file, NARA.
50 Circular of the Office of the Governor General/Labor Department to German Labor Offices, July 5, 1940, file Gouverneur, District Lublin, sygn. 745, pp. 9–14, WAPL; Krüger to Frauendorfer, June 13, 1940, file Gouverneur, District Lublin, sygn. 748, pp. 1–2, WAPL; circular of HSSPF East to Kreis and Stadthauptleute, July 4, 1940, ibid., pp. 6–8.
52 Chana Zylbersztayn to SS Selbstschutz Command, May 30, 1940, file Judenrat, sygn. 20, p. 80, WAPL.
53 Report of the Kreishauptmann Radzyń in Situation Reports of the Kreis and Stadthauptleute for April 1940, May 27, 1940, Bühler Trial, NTN 269, p. 100, IPN; Re-
Odilo Globocnik

and Frank) over this incident, Globocnik sent the Selbstschutz out on another mission in June to massacre some 27 Polish and Jewish civilians at Radawiec, a village located a few miles west of Lublin.54

These massacres, ongoing corruption, and the unwillingness of the police at any level to take up stations in the countryside induced the civilian authorities to establish small enforcement units of ethnic Germans at the disposal of each Kreishauptmann in the Government General. Since mid-March 1940, Krüger and Frank had discussed the possibility of such units to replace policemen over whom neither Himmler nor Krüger wished to relinquish control. On May 6, 1940, Frank established the Sonderdienst (Special Service), which deployed small units of armed ethnic Germans at the disposal of the Kreishauptmänner to perform various police functions. To coordinate the individual units, Frank established an Inspectorate of the Sonderdienst within the office of the Governor General, run by an administrator named Hermann Hammerle.55

By mid-July, complaints from the civilian authorities about the Selbstschutz forced Krüger to agree to the dissolution of the Selbstschutz and the deployment of the Sonderdienst under the authority of the individual Kreis- and Stadthauptmänner. To placate Globocnik, Frank and Hammerle agreed that recruitment for and training of the Sonderdienst would remain under the authority of the SSPF Lublin.56

54 Report to the Jewish Council in Lublin, June 18, 1940, file Judenrat, sygn. 20, p. 89, WAPL; Mańkowski, Między, p. 113. For further details on the Józefów and Radawiec killings, see Black, Rehearsal, pp. 219–222.


56 Police Conference, May 30, 1940, Dienstagsbuch, op. cit., p. 217; Frank Diary, entry for June 27, 1940, ibid., p. 246; Frank Diary, entry for July 10, 1940, ibid.,
In accordance with this agreement, the Selbstschutz was officially dissolved throughout the Government General on August 31, 1940.\(^{57}\) The Lublin Selbstschutz battalion that briefly became the lynchpin of the persecution of Jews and Poles in Lublin District was composed of young ethnic German residents of that District. The typical Selbstschutz recruit was a male resident of Lublin District between 18 and 35 years of age, Lutheran by profession, and engaged in some form of agricultural pursuit. His youth, lack of education, pride in being German and uneasy relationship with his Polish neighbors rendered him susceptible to the blandishments and threats of Globocnik’s recruiters. While on the average, he was less likely to identify with Nazi aims and policies as his counterparts in western Poland, who as German citizens prior to 1918, tended to feel outrage at having to become Polish citizens, or his counterparts in the Soviet Union, for whom relentless Stalinist oppression in the 1930s made the Nazi invader in 1941 appear as liberator,\(^{58}\) some of the recruits committed themselves unequivocally to the Third Reich. Others were attracted by career opportunities, extra rations, or adventure. Still others feared to disobey an official summons and were bullied into service by recruiters or by zealous parents. Other indirect pressures may have included: concern about unemployment or starvation, unbearable family relationships, concern about status within the ethnic German community, and, perhaps, simple boredom.\(^{59}\) Whatever the combination of motives for enlisting, once enrolled, the recruits proved to be, with rare exceptions, pliable tools of the SSPF leadership in Lublin.

The uniqueness of the Lublin Selbstschutz, however, lay in its use by Globocnik as a political weapon to assault the bastions of civilian power in the District. Elsewhere in the Government General, the Selbstschutz was deployed for more routine police duties, and occasionally participated in labor roundups,

\(^{57}\) Service Evaluation for Gustav Stolle, August 31, 1940, G. Stolle SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), A3343/SSO, 0163B/673-674, NARA; order of Himmler, August 9, 1941, RG-242, T-175/150/2679287, NARA. Some smaller units may have operation under SSPF Lublin control as late as November 1940. See Race and Settlement Questionnaire, March 14, 1944, R. Bulitz SS file, RG-242 (former BDC), A3343/RS, A5289/2630, 2632, 2636, NARA.

\(^{58}\) For the ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union, see Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion, Stuttgart 1983, and Meir Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine am Vorabend und Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieges – Ein Fall doppelter Loyalität?, Gehrlen 1984. For the ethnic Germans of western Poland, see Jansen and Weckbecker, Selbstschutz, and Umbreit, Militärverbaltungen, pp. 200–204.

\(^{59}\) Black, Rehearsal, pp. 210, 225.
but always as a formation integrated into the German Gendarmerie. Moreover, the deployment of the Selbstschutz reflected Globocnik’s political and racial fanaticism: he valued control over Jewish labor and lives as much as the fruits of the labor and certainly more than the lives. That his reckless and independent policies should lead to the triumph of the civilian authorities in reclaiming responsibility over the labor process was, to be sure, not in his plans. Within a year after the dissolution of the Selbstschutz, however, Globocnik received a more heinous task for which he needed a similarly recruited and trained cadre and for which the Selbstschutz experience offered something of a training function.

The compromise on the organization of the Sonderdienst collapsed within six months. As SSPF Lublin, Globocnik was responsible to equip and supply new Sonderdienst recruits and train them within the framework of a Sonderdienst Replacement Battalion based in Lublin. That Globocnik, for a time at least, was serious about the compromise is indicated by his assignment of his recruiting specialist, SS-Sturmbannführer Anton Binner, and his personnel specialist, SS-Hauptsturmführer Karl Streibel, as commander and adjutant of Sonderdienst Replacement Battalion. Globocnik and his cronies thus maintained considerable control over the training, placement, discipline and reward of the Sonderdienst recruits, though actual deployment was the responsibility of the individual Kreishauptmänner.

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60 Zörner’s complaints about the Lublin Selbstschutz should be contrasted with District Governor Lasch’s praise for the Radom District Selbstschutz. See Working Conference of the Department Chiefs, Kreishauptmänner, Stadthauptmänner of Radom District, February 24–25, 1940, Frank Diary, Vol. 9. For duties of the Selbstschutz in Radom and Warsaw Districts, see Recommendations of the SSPF Radom for the War Meritorious Service Cross, 2nd Class, November 29, 1940, Zbiór wniosków na odznaczenia/File SSPF Radom, 1940–1944, V/1, pp. 1–3, 4–6, 7–9, 10–12, IPN; Kreishauptmann Skierneiwice to Office of the Governor General, June 11, 1940, Bühler Trial, NTN 272, p. 234, IPN.

61 The literature on the Sonderdienst remains minimal. In addition to Black, Sonderdienst, see Martin Broszat, Der „Sonderdienst“ im Generalgouvernement, in Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. I, Munich 1958, pp. 408–410.

62 For example, in December 1940, Globocnik signed the recommendation for commendation for Emil Komarek, who served in the auxiliary police in Radom City, in the Warsaw Selbstschutz and later in the Sonderdienst for Kreis Radom (and hence never served in Lublin District). SSPF Lublin, List of Recommendations for the Award of the War Meritorious Service Cross, 2nd Class with Swords, no date [November or December 1940], Zbiór wniosków na odznaczenia/File SSPF Lublin, 1940–1944, VII/1, pp. 25–26, IPN. On continuity of personnel, see Globocnik to HSSPF East, March 6, 1942, K. Streibel SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), A3343/SSO, 0166B/220-221, NARA.
Confronted with widespread criticism regarding equipment and uniforms for the Sonderdienst men, Globocnik requested in a huff that Frank relieve him of responsibility for the Sonderdienst. After two more months of wrangling, in which Globocnik was again suspected of having mismanaged funds, Krüger granted Globocnik’s second request to relinquish any control over the Sonderdienst in February 1941. Though he had to accept Streibel, who continued to report to Globocnik in Lublin, as a “consultant” and remained dependent on SS and police personnel as non-commissioned officer detachment leaders for another six months, Hammerle could report a reduction of tension between the Sonderdienst Inspectorate and the SS and Police. The real reason for this tension, beyond Globocnik’s abrasive personality, lay in the efforts of the civilian authorities to establish enforcement units independent of the HSSPF. As Frank told Hammerle on December 14, 1940, the significance of the Sonderdienst as an executive was so great that the civilian authorities “must consciously minimize its importance [...] to distract the attention of other circles.”

Frank and Krüger continued to compete for control over the Sonderdienst until Krüger’s transfer in 1943; but Globocnik withdrew permanently that particular fray in February 1941. Whether he was privy to Heydrich’s submission to Hitler one month earlier of a plan for the removal of the Jews of Europe based on

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66 Frank Diary, December 14, 1940, Vol. VI, p. 1128.

67 In the summer of 1944, the Sonderdienst was absorbed by the Wehrmacht. The events can be followed in Black, Sonderdienst.
calculations concerning the coming attack on the Soviet Union,\textsuperscript{68} must remain speculative; certain is that during the course of 1941, Globocnik received two dynamic new tasks that required the recruitment of an absolutely controlled and ruthlessly led cadre of foot soldiers.

On October 27, 1941, Globocnik recalled Streibel back to Lublin and gave him command of the Trawniki Training Camp\textsuperscript{69}, located near the village of Trawniki, some twenty miles east southeast of Lublin. Globocnik’s deputy, SS-
\textit{Hauptsturmführer} Hermann Höfle, had established the camp at Trawniki under Order Police supervision in early July as a holding center for Jews, Ukrainians and Soviet prisoners of war selected from \textit{Wehrmacht} prisoner of war camps as potential collaborators or as dangerous persons.\textsuperscript{70} The initial purpose of the camp is unclear. In November 1940, Himmler had ordered the establishment of SS and Police Bases (SS- und Polizeistützpunkte), which he conceived of as armed industrialized agricultural complexes located throughout the conquered territories of eastern Poland and, eventually, the Soviet Union. In addition to increasing agricultural production for the German “race,” these “bases” would serve the “maintenance of order and the stabilization of political power” in the East. In short, they were to represent the “extended arm of the German leadership.”\textsuperscript{71}

On July 17, 1941, Hitler entrusted Himmler with exclusive authority for security matters in the occupied Soviet Union. That same day, Himmler appointed Globocnik his Commissioner for the Establishment of the SS and Police Bases in the New Eastern Area (Beauftragter des Reichsführers-SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei – Chef der Ordnungspolizei – für die Errichtung der SS- und Polizeistützpunkte im neuen Ostraum).\textsuperscript{72} One month later, Order Police Chief

\textsuperscript{68} The actual content of Heydrich’s submission is unknown. For two differing opinions as to the specifics of this solution, see Breitman, Architect, pp. 151–162; and Peter Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung: Eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistischen Judenverfolgung, Munich 1998, pp. 285–292.

\textsuperscript{69} Globocnik to HSSPF East, March 6, 1942, K. Streibel SS Officer file RG-242 (former BDC), A3343/SSO, 0166B/220-221, NARA.


\textsuperscript{71} Unsigned and undated report on the Construction of SS and Police Bases [internal evidence indicates authorship in the spring of 1941], O. Globocnik SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), A3343/SSO, 016A/989-996, NARA.

\textsuperscript{72} Decree of the Führer on Police Security in the Newly Occupied Eastern Territories [signed Hitler, Keitel, and Lammers], July 17, 1941, RG-242, T-454/100/680,
Kurt Daluege instructed the HSSPFs in the East and Globocnik in Lublin that they were to establish SS and police bases before the onset of winter and speed up the formation of indigenous auxiliary police forces. That the Trawniki recruits were initially nicknamed “Askaris” after indigenous units deployed by colonists in German East Africa before the First World War speaks to the likelihood that the first Trawniki recruiting was a response to this instruction to provide auxiliary police personnel for the SS and Police bases.

From the summer of 1941 until March 31, 1942, the Trawniki Training Camp was subordinate to Globocnik in his capacity as Commissioner for the Establishment of the SS and Police Bases in the New Eastern Area. For reasons that remain uncertain but which may relate to the German military defeats in the Soviet Union during the winter of 1941 as well as to the assignment to undertake Operation Reinhard, Himmler removed Globocnik from this position at the end of March 1942, while expressing his “gratitude and recognition” for Globocnik’s “outstanding work.”

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73 Chief of the Order Police [signed Daluege] to HSSPFs in the Occupied USSR and Globocnik, August 5, 1941 and September 3, 1941, fond 1323, opis 1, delo 50, RGVA, RG-11.001M.15, Reel 80, Archive of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

74 Order of Himmler, July 21, 1941, O. Globocnik SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), A3343/SSO, 016A/1163, NARA. See also the relevant language in the service obligations signed by the Trawniki men themselves. For example, Service Obligation signed by A. Rige, November 1, 1941, A. Rige Trawniki Personnel File, RG 20869: Guards, Vol. 8, p. 187, Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (hereafter: AFSB); Trawniki Personnel Sheet No. 120 for Alfred Poppe, November 1, 1941, RG-20869: Guards, Vol. 23, p. 142, AFSB Moscow. At the proceedings of the U.S. Government against alleged former Trawniki-trained guard Bronislaw Hajda in Chicago in 1997, prosecutors working for the Office of Special Investigations introduced into evidence captured German records from two record groups held in the Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Record Group 20869: Guards, consists of 25 volumes of individual Trawniki personnel files captured by the Red Army in 1944. Record Group K-779, fund 16, opis 312 e, Vols. 409–411 contain internal personnel transfer correspondence of the Trawniki Training Camp from the years 1943 and 1944. Unfortunately, the key internal correspondence of the years 1941 and 1942 does not appear to have survived the war.

75 Himmler to Globocnik, March 27, 1942, O. Globocnik SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), A3343/SSO, 016A/1135, NARA; See also order of Himmler, May 15, 1942, ibid., frame 1133.
nel were subordinated to Globocnik in his capacity as SS and Police Leader in Lublin District. Whatever the initial or ultimate purpose of the Training Camp, the auxiliary police personnel trained there became a most important instrument in implementing Operation Reinhard.

Exactly when Himmler tasked Globocnik with what came to be called Operation Reinhard remains unclear. Recently, two German scholars have argued that the operation was fully the initiative of Globocnik, who drew up plans for it in the late summer of 1941 and received Himmler’s permission to implement it in October 1941. Surviving documentation leaves few clues as to the

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76 For the change in language on the service obligations, see, for example, Service Obligation signed by Johann Kondratenko, June 23, 1942, Trawniki Personnel File No. 1909, Proceedings against Ivan Kondratenko, Case 6056, Archival Number 57800, State Archive of the Ukrainian Security Service (Derzhavnyy Arkhiv Sluzhby Bezpeky Ukrainy. Hereafter: ASBU Kiev), Kiev Ukraine.

77 Even the time when the operation received its name remains a mystery. Most historians now agree that the operation was named after Reinhard Heydrich to commemorate his assassination in Prague in June 1942 and the name „Operation Reinhard“ appears in the scant correspondence that survived the war only after June 1942, the month of his death. On the other hand, the operation itself had begun with the construction of stationary killing centers in the autumn of 1941 and there is no evidence as to its name prior to the summer of 1942. Given the ultimate purpose of physically annihilating the Jews of Europe and Heydrich’s increasingly prominent leadership in „resolving the Jewish question,“ the SS leadership might have found it appropriate to link the operation with Heydrich’s name even before his death. There is even dispute over the spelling of Reinhard. Recently, some German scholars, have used the spelling „Reinhardt.“ See Peter Witte et al., eds., Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers1941/42, Hamburg 1999, p. 493, note 78; Musial, Zivilverwaltung, p. 215. I have found three spellings in the documentation. For „Reinhardt,“ see memorandum of municipal Police Detachment Commander in Sobibor to SSPF Lublin/Einsatz Reinhardt-Inspector of the SS Special Detachment, February 4, 1943, Trawniki Personnel File for Georg Bäcker (No. 45), RG-20869: Guards, Vol. 10, p. 171, AFSB Moscow. For „Abteilung Reinhard,“ see SSPF Lublin/Department Reinhard/Inspector of SS Special Detachments to Trawniki Training Camp, July 8, 1943, I. Kulak Trawniki Personnel File (No. 505), RG-20869: Guards, Vol. 4, p. 134, AFSB; for „Einsatz Reinhart,“ see Commander of SS Special Detachment Sobibor to SSPF Lublin/Operation Reinhart/Inspector of the SS Special Detachments, July 1, 1943, RG K-779, fund 16, opis 312 e, Vol. 409, p. 42, AFSB Moscow. In his own correspondence, Globocnik himself appears to have used „Reinhard“ consistently. See Globocnik to von Herff, April 13, 1943, C. Wirth SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), A3343/SSO, 0251B/310-311, NARA; Globocnik to SS Personnel Main Office, May 22, 1943, ibid., frame 309.

78 Musial, Zivilverwaltung, pp. 201–208; Bogdan Musial, The Origins of „Operation Reinhard“: The Decision-Making Process for the Mass Murder of the Jews in the
exact parameters of the operation in 1941, though it is quite clear that Himmler tasked Globocnik directly with its implementation. As early as April 1941, Himmler notified Globocnik’s increasingly nominal superior, Krüger, of the intention to discuss, among other things, a “new series of tasks” for Globocnik in Lublin during his visit to Kraków the following month. In his concluding report on the purpose, aims and activities of Operation Reinhard, Globocnik described four aspects of the program: (1) extermination of the Polish Jews; (2) evaluation of the remaining Jewish labor potential; (3) evaluation of property and valuables (including cash and jewelry) taken from the Jews at the time of the murders; and (4) retrieving hidden assets (such as stocks and bonds) and stationary property (real estate, factory plant) that belonged to the murdered Jews.

During the autumn of 1941, Globocnik established what later became known as the Operation Reinhard Staff in the SSPF Lublin office. He appointed SS-Hauptsturmführer Hermann Höfle as his Expert for Jewish Matters in the “Special Action Reinhardt.” Assisted by personnel borrowed from the staff of the Commissioner for the Establishment of SS and Police Bases, Höfle began to plan for major deportation operations to specific sites in Eastern Poland. A sec-
ond department, later known as the Inspectorate of the SS Special Detachments (Inspektion des SS-Sonderkommandos) was led by Christian Wirth, who arrived in Lublin in the autumn of 1941 staffed with personnel from the recently decentralized “euthanasia” program. Until August 1941, these men had implemented the “T-4” program to murder institutionalized persons with physical and intellectual disabilities by carbon monoxide gas at stationary killing centers throughout the Reich.\(^8^2\) As early as November 1941, small squads of guards trained at Trawniki arrived at three sites in Eastern Poland: Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka. There they guarded Jewish, Polish, and Soviet prisoner of war labor under the supervision of SSPF technical personnel transferred in part from T-4 to construct stationary killing centers.\(^8^3\) With the arrival of more personnel from T-4, integrated with selected non-commissioned SS officers from Globocnik’s staff in Lublin, the three notorious killing centers were up and running in March 1942 (Belzec), May 1942 (Sobibor) and July 1942 (Treblinka II).

To operate and to deport the Polish Jews to the killing centers, Globocnik, Höfle, Wirth required a loyal, reliable, ruthlessly trained and led cadre of men. Perhaps with the precedent of the Selbstschutz in mind, Globocnik decided to supply Operation Reinhard with the needed manpower from the Trawniki Training Camp no later than the time of Streibel’s arrival in late October 1941. The first recruits received their status as auxiliary police guards at Trawniki.

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during the first week of September 1941.\textsuperscript{84} By mid-September, nearly 1,000 recruits had arrived in the camp and were receiving training.\textsuperscript{85} Virtually all of the initial recruits were “volunteers” from among the Soviet soldiers incarcerated in German prisoner of war camps in Lublin, Chełm, Rovno, Biała-Podlaska, Białystok, Zhytomyr, and Grodno. Operating in line with Heydrich’s instructions on selecting potential collaborators from the captured Soviet soldiers,\textsuperscript{86} German police recruiters combed the camps for ethnic Germans, German language-speakers, soldiers of non-Russian nationality who could be presumed to have reason to hate the Bolshevik regime, and, when the need became overwhelming, persons who seemed healthy, despite the dreadful conditions in the camp.\textsuperscript{87} Many of the ethnic Germans came from Ukraine, the Volga Republic, or the scattered communities of eastern Russia, including Siberia.\textsuperscript{88} As the SSPF

\textsuperscript{84} Naturalization Application for Theodor Heinrich (Trawniki No. 31), February 28, 1944, T. Heinrich EWZ file, RG-242 (former BDC), UdSSR Anträge, C64/1220-1223, NARA; letter from Streibel to the Commander of Security Police in Thorn (Toruń), West Prussia, January 19, 1943, K. Schubrich Trawniki Personnel file (No. 2), RG-20869: Guards, Vol. 11, p. 141, AFSB Moscow; Personalbogen No. 178, K. Diner Trawniki Personnel File, Proceedings against Karl Diner, pp. 200–204, file 2271, AFSB Blagoveshchensk.

\textsuperscript{85} Some of the first recruits had been Soviet officers. See Naturalization Application signed Jakob Reimer, February 22, 1944, J. Reimer EWZ file (former BDC), UdSSR Anträge, G63/1968-1971, NARA; Personalbogen No. 865, J. Reimer Trawniki Personnel File, Derzhavnyy Arkhiv Zaporiz’koi Oblast (DAZO). Others had been born German citizens in the territories that became part of Poland in 1918 and had been serving in the Polish army when captured by the Soviets in 1939. See K. Schubrich Trawniki Personnel File (No. 2), RG-20869: Guards, Vol. 11, pp. 139–149, AFSB Moscow; L. Bisewski Trawniki Personnel File (No. 8), ibid., Vol. 14, pp. 200–207; and X. Rucinski Trawniki Personnel File (No. 119), Vol. 6, pp. 226–236.

\textsuperscript{86} See Appendix 2 to Operations Order No. 8 of the Chief of Security Police and SD [signed Heydrich], re: Guidelines for the Detachments of the Chief of Security Police and SD Detailed to Prisoner of War Camps and Prisoner of War Transit Camps, July 17, 1941, RG-238, NO-3414, NARA.

\textsuperscript{87} For an example of a healthy-looking ethnic German, whose father had been deported by the Soviet authorities in the 1930s and who therefore fit all qualifications, see F. Swidersky Trawniki Personnel File (No. 26), fond 1367, opis 1, delo 239, pp. 1–5, Gosudarstvennyy Voennyy Arkhiv Rossiiyskoy Federatsii (State Military Archives of the Russian Federation), Moscow (hereafter: RGVA Moscow).

\textsuperscript{88} See, for example, ibid.; Application for Naturalization, signed by Heinrich Schäfer, February 19, 1944, H. Schäfer EWZ file, RG-242 (former BDC), UdSSR Anträge, H18/ 2240-2243, NARA; and Trawniki Personnel Sheet No. 81 for Eugen Binder, E. Binder Trawniki Personnel File, RG-20869: Guards, Vol. 2, pp. 282–284; Personnel Sheet No. 55 for Heinrich Schütz, November 1, 1941, RG K-779, fond 16, opis 312 e, Vol. 411, p. 411, AFSB.
administrators realized the magnitude of the task in front of them, they added Ukrainians, Estonians, Latvians\textsuperscript{89}, Lithuanians\textsuperscript{90}, Belarusians\textsuperscript{91}, Russians\textsuperscript{92}, Romanians from the North Bukovina and Bessarabia\textsuperscript{93}, Tartars\textsuperscript{94} and the occasional Chuvash\textsuperscript{95}, Eurotin and Komi.\textsuperscript{96} One of the Soviet prisoners of war who served as the orderly for the commandant of the Treblinka labor camp, was later known to have been half-Jewish.\textsuperscript{97}

By March 1942, the Trawniki Training camp had roughly 1,250 recruits, virtually all selected from among the Soviet prisoners of war captured during the 1941 campaign.\textsuperscript{98} In June and July 1942, Streibel selected another 1,200 Soviet soldiers from among those captured in the south Ukraine and in the Crimea in May 1942 along with a smattering of Baltic nationals who were separated from their Soviet comrades and incarcerated in prisoner of war camps inside Germany.\textsuperscript{99} As German military reverses and murderous treatment of Soviet POWs in German custody dried up the supply of Soviet soldiers to recruit as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{89} Commander of Security Police and SD in Lublin/Field Office Krasnik to Commander of Security Police and SD Lublin, August 23, 1943, RG K-779, fund 16, inventory 312 e, Vol. 409, p. 228, AFSB Moscow. The KdS Field Office Krasnik applied here for a transfer of the Latvian Trawniki-trained non-commissioned officer because he was unable to get along with his Ukrainian Trawniki-trained subordinates.
  \item \textsuperscript{90} Trawniki Personnel Sheet No. 1628 for Luidas Kairys, June 23, 1942, L. Kairys Trawniki Personnel File, fond 1173, ap. 4, b. 51, p. 1, Central State Archives, Vilnius.
  \item \textsuperscript{91} Trawniki Personnel Sheet No. 443 for Konstantin Demida, no date, K. Demida Trawniki Personnel File, RG-20869: Guards, Vol. 24, p. 116, AFSB Moscow.
  \item \textsuperscript{92} Trawniki Personnel Sheet No. 1996 for Anatolij Rumjanzew, July 22, 1942, Trawniki Personnel File for A. Rumjanzew, RG-20869, Vol. 23, p. 186, AFSB, Moscow.
  \item \textsuperscript{93} Trawniki Personnel Sheet No. 206, for Valerian Danko, February 27, 1942, V. Danko Trawniki Personnel File, RG-20869: Guards, p. 190, AFSB, Moscow.
  \item \textsuperscript{94} Service Identity Card for Nurgali Kabirow, No. 1337, RG-20869: Guards, Vol. 22, p. 318, AFSB Moscow.
  \item \textsuperscript{95} Trawniki Personnel Sheet No. 2182 for Jakow Kusmin, July 13, 1942, RG-20869: Guards, Vol. 22, p. 374, AFSB Moscow.
  \item \textsuperscript{96} SSPF Lublin/Training Camp Trawniki to Commander of Security Police and SD for District Lublin, May 6, 1943, RG K-779, fond 16, opis 312 e, Vol. 411, pp. 78–79, AFSB Moscow.
  \item \textsuperscript{97} Excerpt from interrogation of Emil Gutharz, November 30, 1949, Proceedings against Kurt Franz, file 208 AR-Z 23/59, Vol. 21, pp. 5649–5650, ZdL.
  \item \textsuperscript{98} SS and Police Leader in Lublin, „Recommendation for Promotion of Karl Streibel,“ March 6, 1942, K. Streibel SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), A3343/SSO, Reel 166B, frames 220–221, NARA.
  \item \textsuperscript{99} See, for example, Trawniki Personnel File for Luidas Kairys, No. 1628, fond 1173, ap. 4, b. 51, pp. 1–4, Central State Archives, Vilnius, Lithuania.
\end{itemize}
collaborators, Streibel’s men began in the late autumn of 1942 and the winter and spring of 1943 to conscript civilians from ethnic groups thought to be politically and racially “reliable.” These included young men of the west Ukraine (Galicia and Podolia), regions thought to be hostile to the Soviet regime (February and April 1943),\(^{100}\) persons working for other German authorities,\(^{101}\) members of the Goralian mountain population in the Tatra mountains between Poland and Slovakia (January 1943),\(^{102}\) a sprinkling of ethnic Poles (November 1942),\(^{103}\) and ethnic Ukrainians from Lublin District (June–July 1943).\(^{104}\) When Globocnik left Lublin in September 1943, he reported that approximately 3,700 men were serving in the Trawniki system.\(^{105}\) A final wave of recruits,

\(^{100}\) Personnel Sheet No. 3227 for Iwan Merenda, February 18, 1943, RG-20869: Guards, Vol. 6, p. 203.

\(^{101}\) One recruit had been employed as a railroad switchman for the Ostbahn in Novograd-Volynsky, Ukraine when he was recruited in August 1942. See interrogation of R. N., October 4, 1968, proceedings against Hermann Weinrich, 197 Js 38/65, file 206 AR-Z 15/65, Vol. 17, p. 3562, ZdL. Georg Ossowoy had been serving in the Wehrmacht and had been wounded in the early days of the battle for Stalingrad and was recruited for Trawniki in October 1942. He later sought and received a transfer to the Waffen SS. See SS Garrison Headquarters Lublin to SS Operations Main Office, August 11, 1943, file SSPF Lublin/891, sygn. 18, p. 15, IPN; SS Operations Main Office to SS Garrison Headquarters, Lublin, August 21, 1943, ibid., p. 29.

\(^{102}\) Bonifacy Pawlowski had been a civilian employee of the Organization Todt, a corps of civilian engineers and construction crews, when he was recruited for Trawniki in February 1943. See service book for Bonifacy Pawlowski, No. 069964, file SSPF Lublin/891, sygn. 18, p. 75, IPN; Trawniki Personnel Sheet No. 3641 for Bonifacy Pawlowski, February 19, 1943, ibid., p. 73. Another recruit had been working in the kitchen of the German Labor Service in his home town of Kolomyya in east Galicia, when he was recruited. See interrogation of M. M., February 25, 1969, Proceedings against Karl Streibel et al., Vol. 81, p. 15545, Public Prosecutor’s Office at Hamburg.


\(^{105}\) Globocnik to von Herff [Chief of the SS Personnel Main Office], October 27, 1943, J. Schwarzenbacher SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), A3343-SSO, 123B/408-409, NARA. Actually more than 4,710 had been recruited by this time, but the force had been weakened by deaths, disciplinary actions, mutinies, and desertions.
a combination of Russian and Ukrainian auxiliary policemen from the Reich Commissariat Ukraine and former Soviet Army officers, arrived in Trawniki between December 1943 and May 1944, after Globocnik had left Lublin.

By the summer of 1942, some 1,000 men were serving at Trawniki in two battalions of four companies each and as many as 1,500 more served at various locations in Lublin and the Warsaw District. Between 30 and 40 German SS and police non-commissioned officers commanded various levels those serving at the training camp itself. Battalion commanders were officers holding the rank of 2nd Lieutenant (SS-Untersturmführer Willi Franz and SS-Untersturmführer Johann Schwarzenbacher). The companies were generally commanded by German SS and police non-commissioned officers. As the Trawniki-trained guards gained seniority, their ethnic background, language skills, loyalty, ruthlessness, and command ability made them eligible to become non-commissioned officers and to command squads and platoons. Streibel developed a separate and unique system of ranks, based on the non-commissioned ranks of the German Order Police. The initial rank was that of Wachmann with the highest achievable rank being Oberzugwachmann. The Trawniki men were not uniformly armed or uniformed. The first recruits continued to wear their Soviet army uniforms without insignia for a time. In the autumn of 1941, the Trawniki men received the black uniforms (dyed Polish army uniforms) of the former Selbstschutz. During the summer of 1942, captured earth brown Belgian Army uniforms were introduced. As numerous desertion reports indicated, many Trawniki men wore a combination of the two uniforms. The Trawniki men generally carried cap-
tured weapons, but some received German carbines and even automatic rifles and pistols while on special deployment.\footnote{See Streibel Judgment, p. 276.}

The Trawniki-trained guards formed the backbone of all aspects of Operation Reinhard under Globocnik’s authority. Commanded by small units of German SS and police, they were deployed at company strength (90 to 120 men) to staff the SS Special Detachments at the killing centers at Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka.\footnote{SSPF Lublin/Trawniki Training Camp to SS Special Detachment in Sobibor, March 26, 1943, RG K-779, fund 16, inventory 312 e, Vol. 411, pp. 271–272, AFSB, Moscow; SSPF Lublin/Trawniki Training Camp to SS Special Detachment in Sobibor, April 11, 1943, ibid., Vol. 410, p. 277, AFSB, Moscow; Commander of SS Special Detachment Sobibor to SSPF Lublin/Operation Reinhardt/Inspector of the SS Special Detachments, July 1, 1943, ibid., Vol. 409, p. 42; SS Special Detachment Belzec to Training Camp Trawniki, May 19, 1943, ibid., Vol. 409, p. 150; SS Special Detachment Belzec [signed Hering] to SS-Hauptsturmführer Streibel, March 2, 1943, ibid., p. 376. For Treblinka, see SSPF Lublin/Inspector of SS Special Detachments to Commander of Gendarmerie, Commander of Security Police and SD, and Commander of the Trawniki Training Camp in District Lublin, March 17, 1943, RG K-779, fund 16, inventory 312 e, Vol. 409, p. 27, AFSB Moscow.}

There they guarded the killing centers and supervised the surviving “work Jews” who “assisted” new victims into the gas chambers, disposed of the corpses, and sorted and packed the loot for shipment to Lublin or to Berlin. Units from company to battalion size were dispatched to deportation sites throughout the Government General and the Białystok District to assist local German Municipal Police and Security Police officials in clearing major and minor ghettos. The Trawniki men were instrumental in emptying the Lublin ghetto in March 1942, the Warsaw Ghetto on three occasions (June–September 1942, January 1943, and April–May 1943)\footnote{Memorandum of SSPF Lublin/Trawniki Training Camp, Listing of Those [Trawniki] Guards of All Ranks to Detachment Warsaw, April 17, 1943, RG K-779, Fond 16, opis 312 e, Vol. 411, pp. 127–130, AFSB Moscow; Report of the SS and Police Leader in Warsaw, SS-Brigadeführer Jürgen Stroop, The Warsaw Ghetto is No More, May 16, 1943, RG-238, 1061-PS, IMT XXVI, p. 632.}, the Częstochowa and other District Radom ghettos in September–October 1942\footnote{Personnel Sheet No. 26 for Franz Swidersky, F. Swidersky Trawniki Personnel File, fund 1367, opis 1, delo 239, p. 1, RGVA, Moscow.}, and the Białystok ghetto on two occasions (February 1943 and August 1943).\footnote{See Arad, Belzec, pp. 54–67, 125–137, 383–398. For Trawniki deployment in Lublin, see Judgment in Proceedings against Lothar Hoffmann et al., file 8 Ks 1/70, Vol. 4, Abt. 468, Nr. 362, Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Wiesbaden. For deployment in Białystok, see SSPF Lublin/Trawniki Training Camp/Detachment Poniatowa
commanded by the regional SS and Police Leader, supervised on the spot by the personnel of the local Commander of Security Police and SD, and supported by local German municipal police or gendarmerie detachments. They were coordinated, however, by Höfle and his small staff, supported by the violence, brutality, and increasing expertise of the Trawniki-trained guards, who cordoned off the ghettos and assisted Order Police and Jewish policemen in moving the Jews out of their apartments to train stations. Trawniki-trained guards also carried out operations in smaller ghettos throughout District Lublin.\textsuperscript{115}

The Trawniki men also provided the guard units for the Operation Reinhard labor camps throughout Lublin District, including the Lipowa Lager and the Airstrip Camps in Lublin, and the labor camps at Trawniki, Poniatowa\textsuperscript{116}, Budzyn\textsuperscript{117}, and Kraśnik\textsuperscript{118}. As Globocnik later wrote to Himmler’s adjutant, the purpose of this labor camp system was four-fold: (1) to relieve the burden of increased war production from the industrial plant of the Reich; (2) to release German workers for other purposes and to reduce the acute labor shortage in the Reich; (3) to relocate key and sensitive industries and plant damaged by or vulnerable to Allied bombing; and (4) to increase production through tighter supervision as well as to eliminate profit skimming in the war industry.\textsuperscript{119} For a

\textsuperscript{115} For the deportations from Międzyrzec-Podlaski, see Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, New York 1998, pp. 90–96. See also notation of telephone call to Training Camp Trawniki from SS-Hauptsturmführer Michalsen, May 3, 1943, RG K-779, fund 16, opis 312 e, Vol. 409, p. 106, AFSB Moscow. Michalsen had telephoned in a request for the detail of a non-commissioned officer and 10 Trawniki men to Niemlischez in Kreis Radzyń to accompany a transport of “approximately 600 Jews to T.\textsuperscript{reblinka II}.”


\textsuperscript{118} SS-WVHA/SS Training Camp Trawniki (signed Franz) to SSPF Lublin/SS Labor Camp Krasnik, October 19, 1943, RG K-779, fund 16, opis 312 e, vol. 411, p. 158, AFSB, Moscow.

\textsuperscript{119} Undated report of June 1943, attached to letter from Globocnik to R. Brandt [Personal Staff, Reichsführer SS], June 21, 1943, RG-238, NO-485, NARA.
time in the winter of 1941–1942 and 1942–1943, Trawniki-trained units guarded
the Prisoner of War Camp Lublin on the edge of the city, which officially became
the Lublin Concentration Camp on February 15, 1943 (and to which Polish and
Jewish prisoners referred as Majdanek). Small detachments also guarded vari-
ous estates in District Lublin, some of which engaged Jewish forced laborers and
many of which were slated to become SS and Police bases.

Finally, Trawniki men guarded the collection sites for booty taken off the
murdered Jews, including the *Bekleidungslager* in Lublin. In preparation for
the impending deportation of 300,000 Jews from the Warsaw ghetto, Globocnik
ordered Höfle, his deportation expert, and *SS-Sturmbannführer* Georg Wippern,
the administrative manager of Operation Reinhard, to establish a central file card
index in which Wippern’s clerks would record all valuables obtained during the
course of the “resettlement of the Jews.” Globocnik instructed Wippern to is-
sue monthly status reports. On September 16, 1942, Globocnik issued more
detailed instructions that required Operation Reinhard personnel to identify and
record cash, foreign exchange, precious stones, clothing and other valuables ob-
tained “during the course of the ‘resettlement’” in a consistent, systematic fash-
on, regardless of where the material was sorted. The central file index, including
all entries of material coming into the recently established sorting centers in
Lublin and Trawniki, would be maintained by Department IVa of the office of
the SSPF. As indicated in these instructions, a storage and evaluation station

120 SSPF Lublin/Trawniki Training Camp to Detachment Prisoner of War Camp Lublin,
February 15, 1943, RG K-779, fund 16, opis 312 e, Vol. 410, p. 286, AFSB Mos-
cow.

121 For example at the SS and Police Base on the Jablon Estate in Kreis Radzyń. See
SSPF Lublin/Training Camp Trawniki to SS and Police Base in Jablon, January 6,
1943, RG K-779, fund 16, opis 312 e, Vol. 410, p. 85, AFSB Moscow; and SSPF
Lublin/Training Camp Trawniki to SS and Police Base Skierbieszow, July 27, 1943,
ibid., p. 135.

122 SS Special Detachment Belzec to Training Camp Trawniki, May 19, 1943, RG
K-779, fund 16, opis 312 „e.“ Vol. 409, p. 150.

123 Globocnik to Höfle and Wippern, July 15, 1942, Document No. 312, published in
Tatiana Berenstein et al., *Faschismus, Getto, Massenmord: Dokumentation über
Ausrottung und Widerstand der Juden in Polen während des zweiten Weltkrieges*
(Frankfurt am Main: Röderberg-Verlag, 1960), p. 401.

124 SSPF Lublin [signed Globocnik], „Decree on the Management of a Card File Index
in the Camps Trawniki, Chopin Street 27, Clothing Works of the Waffen SS and
Department IVa on [the staff of ] the SS and Police Leader,” September 16, 1942,
reproduced in *Dokumenty i Materiały: Dziejów Okupacji Niemieckiej w Polsce.*
for the clothing of the Jews murdered during Operation Reinhard was established at Trawniki in the summer of 1942 and guarded by Trawniki men.\textsuperscript{125}

Under Globocnik’s leadership, the Trawniki-trained guards responded to needs in other regions. From November 1941, Trawniki men guarded the Treblinka Labor Camp under the leadership of the SSPF in Warsaw District.\textsuperscript{126} From May 1942 to November 1943, a Trawniki-trained detachment guarded the notorious forced labor camp for Jews under the jurisdiction of the SSPF L'viv on Janów Street in L'viv, and participated in the dreadful liquidations of Jewish workers there.\textsuperscript{127} Prior to its becoming a concentration camp in the summer of 1943, a Trawniki-trained detachment guarded the Płaszów forced labor camp for the SSPF Kraków.\textsuperscript{128} Trawniki trained guards also served the staff of the SSPF in Radom.\textsuperscript{129} Streibel even sent one detachment to Germany to guard laborers at

\textsuperscript{125} Not completely confident that Globocnik could accomplish this type of accounting operation on his own, Himmler had ordered on August 12, 1942 that the Reinhard booty be transferred to the WVHA, which would be responsible for further transfer to the appropriate agencies. See circular of R. Brandt to Higher SS and Police Leaders in the Eastern Territories, August 12, 1942, RG-238, NO-3192, NARA; Brandt to Pohl, August 12, 1942, ibid.. For details on how the loot was to be distributed, see August Frank [WVHA] to Operation Reinhard Headquarters and Concentration Camp Auschwitz, September 26, 1942, RG-238, NO-724, NARA; Arad, Belzec, pp. 154–155.

\textsuperscript{126} Likewise, a barrack was set aside at the Poniatowa Forced Labor Camp for the storage of clothing of the murdered Warsaw Jews. See SSPF Lublin/Labor Camp Poniatowa/Administration, signed Hantke, to W.C. Többens, March 25, 1943, G. Michalsen SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), NARA.

\textsuperscript{127} Commander of Trawniki Training Camp/Detachment Lublin to SSPF Lemberg, May 17, 1943, RG K-779, fund 16, opis „312 e,“ Vol. 411, pp. 299–300, AFSB Moscow; Personnel Sheet No. 120 for Alfred Poppe, RG-20869: Guards, Vol. 23, pp. 142, AFSB Moscow.


the Heinkel Works in Rostock, and another in March 1943 to supplement the SS Death’s Head Battalion at the Auschwitz Concentration Camp complex.

Globocnik, Höfle, Wirth, and their colleagues in Operation Reinhard were responsible for the estimated deaths of 1.7 million Jews, and undetermined numbers of Roma (Gypsies), Poles and Soviet prisoners of war. That the Trawniki men played a central role in Operation Reinhard is apparent from the awards and promotions received by the German officials who commanded them. In seeking Streibel’s promotion to SS- Sturmbannführer, Globocnik noted that Streibel had commanded the Trawniki Training Camp “with the greatest discretion and understanding for the special leadership needs of this unit. These units have proved themselves in the best way in many anti-partisan missions, but especially in the framework of the Jewish resettlement.” After a visit to Trawniki and Sobibor, Himmler approved the promotion of several German SS officials involved in Operation Reinhard, including Wirth and killing center commandants Stangl, Hering, and Reitleitner. Nor did the Trawniki men themselves go unrecognized. In 1942, Wasil Chlopecki became eligible for family support benefits in part based on his “missions” in “the resettlement of the Jews.”

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133 SSPF Lublin [signed Globocnik] to HSSPF East, May 15, 1943, K. Streibel SS Officer file, RG-242/BDC, A3343/SSO, Reel 166B, frames 206–207, NARA.
136 SSPF Lublin/SS-Training Camp Trawniki [signed Streibel], Recommendation List No. 4 for Decorations for Bravery for Members of the Peoples of the East, 2nd Class
Alexej Milutin “belonged for a long time to the Special Detachment Treblinka and conducted himself well there.”

True to the previous Selbstschutz pattern, but on a much grander and more violent scale, the discipline of the Trawniki-trained guards, whose brutality and availability made Operation Reinhard possible, did not always make them the absolutely reliable force of Globocnik’s ideal. Most common among violations were absences without leave, theft, violation of curfew, drunkenness, falling asleep on guard duty, and corruption. Generally, Trawniki men who ran afoul of the rules were put in lock-up for five, ten or fifteen days; sometimes Trawniki men were punished by the lash. On occasion, the Trawniki-trained guards mutinied, as in Belzec in April 1943, or deserted in groups, as at Belzec in the winter of 1943, at Auschwitz in July 1943, and at Trawniki itself. Once
confined to concentration camp service after enjoying the free cash and provisions available to extort from petrified Jews during the deportation operations or to take from their bodies after killing them, many Trawniki men had difficulty settling down. On January 24, 1943, after several Trawniki-trained guards stationed at the Prisoner of War Camp Lublin had violated a quarantine order not to leave the camp, the Commander of the SS guard detachment passed on to the camp commandant the assessment of the SS commander of the two companies of Trawniki-trained guards at what later became Majdanek Concentration Camp: “SS-Oberscharführer Ehrlinger does not consider the Ukrainians reliable. They will mutiny without hesitation as soon as they have a favorable opportunity. The presently regulated guard and escort duty is too boring for the Ukrainians. Besides, they cannot ‘earn’ anything. The enthusiasm for service under German command totally disappeared the moment that the clearing of the ghettos (Warsaw, Częstochowa, Radom, and many other cities), and the Ukrainians were brought to routine service. During the clearing work [Räumungsarbeiten], they were swimming in money; they miss that now. They line up first when it comes to robbery and murder. One could not imagine their reliability for other service.”

Globocnik himself, at least initially, found the work exhilarating. One scholar has argued that Operation Reinhard, that is the goal of killing the Jews, first of Lublin District and then of the Government General, was the inspiration of Globocnik rather than Himmler. Given the absence of paper evidence from the center, however, too many officials in too many places were reaching for the killing option at the same time to negate the suspicion that the top Nazi leadership (Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich, Daluege) had in fact articulated the general goal, may even have given specific assignments and, in the late summer and autumn of 1941, were awaiting proposals on implementation. In all likelihood, the SS leadership decided to begin the annihilation of the Jews of the Government General in September–October 1941, in the broader context of Himmler’s and Globocnik’s plans to Germanize Lublin District and points East – and to begin with the city and Kreis of Zamość. Indeed, Globocnik had always figured prominently in Himmler’s ultimate plans for the occupied Eastern territories. Certain of his gratitude, loyalty, ideological ardor, and imaginative approach to problem-solving, Himmler had, after all, entrusted Globocnik

143 Commander of the SS Death’s Head Battalion, Prisoner of War Camp Lublin [signed Langleist] to Commandant’s Headquarters, Prisoner of War Camp Lublin of the Waffen SS, January 24, 1943, fund 117, opis 4, delo 6, Central State Archive, Vilnius.
144 Musial, Zivilverwaltung, pp. 201–206; Musial, Origins, p. 115.
145 Musial, Zivilverwaltung, pp. 201–203.
with the initial plans for establishing SS and Police bases in the occupied East. This policy required the removal of Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians from the proposed areas of settlement. Globocnik had been studying the issue since the autumn of 1940 and recruited teams of young SS professionals – engineers, architects, agronomists, population experts, climatologists, etc. – to Lublin to plan the future bases, prompting the chief of Security Police and SD in Lublin to state after the war that it was “unique in the entire history of the occupation all of that that Globocnik did.”

Himmler chose Globocnik to manage Operation Reinhard because he was certain of Globocnik’s commitment to the cause and will to employ radical methods to accomplish the task regardless of bureaucratic, technological, and human obstacles. Indeed, on the eve of the deportations from Lublin, Himmler even proposed to Frank and others that District Governor Zörner be removed and that the position of District Governor and SS and Police Leader in Lublin be temporarily merged in Globocnik’s person. After Himmler ordered the accelerated annihilation of the Jews during his visit to Lublin in July 1942, Globocnik wrote to Himmler’s liaison officer at Hitler’s headquarters, Karl Wolff of his gratitude for “so much new work” that would “realize all of our secret wishes.” Globocnik may even have urged Himmler to issue the order, for he had earlier expressed his concern to Führer Chancery official and former T-4 coordinator Viktor Brack that one must “implement the entire Jewish operation as rapidly as humanly possible so as not one day to get stuck in the middle of the operation in the event that some difficulties might require putting a halt to the operation.” The availability of the Trawniki-trained guard force and experienced killers from the SSPF office and the euthanasia program, Globocnik had the tools necessary to implement the operation with dreadful success. With past experience in mind, Himmler required a final accounting of valuables and property processed through Operation Reinhard, which was formally concluded on October 19, 1943, a task Globocnik was eager to accept due to his desire to dispel the impression that he “did not maintain the necessary order in all economic matters.” Himmler expressed his

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147 Memorandum for the file regarding a meeting between Lammers, Bormann, Frank and Himmler, signed Himmler, March 5, 1942, RG-238, NG-3333, NARA.

148 Globocnik to Wolff, July 22, 1942, O. Globocnik SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), A3343/SSO, 016A/1129-1130, NARA; Brack to Himmler, June 23, 1942, RG-238, NO-205, NARA.
gratitude for Globocnik’s “great and unique services, which you have performed for the entire German people.”

By this time Globocnik had already left Lublin, his “Germanization” project for Zamość County in shambles. During his visit to Lublin in July 1941, Himmler had approved a Globocnik proposal that the city of Lublin and Kreis Zamość form a link in a chain of ethnic German settlement to eventually be linked with bases in the Baltic States and the ethnic German communities of Transylvania. Globocnik intended that this ring would “encircle by settlement and gradually throttle the remainder of the Polish Nation [das verbleibende Polentum] in the western border zone economically and biologically.” With Himmler’s approval, Globocnik initiated the resettlement project in the autumn of 1942, forcibly removing nearly 110,000 Poles and Ukrainians from 300 villages in Kreise Zamość, Hrubieszów, Bilgoraj, and Tomaszów-Lubelski. Around 9,000 ethnic Germans from Bessarabia were the first ethnic Germans to replace the evacuees. SS and police authorities, supported by Trawniki-trained auxiliaries, carried out the deportations. Ill-planned and implemented with chaotic haste and unconscionable brutality, the operation engendered “war in the [Lublin] District.” District Governor Zörner, whom Globocnik had kept in the dark, argued with Frank’s endorsement that both security and agricultural production would collapse if the SS did not halt the deportations. Though Himmler instructed Frank that one should not “be over anxious about these intentions,” Globocnik’s population policy in Zamość undoubtedly contributed to his ouster in September 1943.

At the same time, Globocnik was losing control over the Trawniki-trained guards. In August 1943, the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office (SS-Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt) made a successful bid to take over the Trawniki Training Camp and the Operation Reinhard labor camp system in District Lublin. Trawniki became the SS Training Camp Trawniki and the

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149 Globocnik to Himmler, January 1, 1944, PS-4024, IMT XXXIV, pp. 70–71; Himmler to Globocnik, November 30, 1943, ibid., pp. 69–70.
150 Müller [RuSHA Lublin] to Hofmann [RuSHA Berlin], October 15, 1941, O. Globocnik SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), A3343/SSO, 016A/1141-1143, NARA.
151 Interrogation of J. Müller, November 5, 1947, RG-238, M-1019/49/868, NARA.
153 Himmler to Frank, July 3, 1943, RG-238, NO-2444, NARA.
154 Chief WVHA, Memorandum on the Takeover of Jewish Labor Camps of the SSPFs in the GG, [signed Pohl], September 7, 1943, RG-238, NO-599, NARA; Decree
labor camps at Trawniki, Poniatowa became subcamps of the Lublin (Majdanek) Concentration Camp. SS-Gruppenführer Jakob Sporrenberg, Globocnik’s successor, and Streibel were able to regain control of the Training Camp and its remaining 1,500 trained guards for the SSPF Lublin in the winter of 1944, after the SS leadership, unnerved by Jewish resistance in Warsaw, Treblinka and Sobibor, murdered the remainder of the Operation Reinhard labor force in early November 1943, under the code name Operation Harvest Festival. By this time Globocnik had long left Lublin.

In the summer of 1943, with Operation Reinhard virtually concluded and Kreise Zamość and Biłgoraj in total disarray, Himmler had thought it prudent to recall Globocnik from Lublin. As early as January 1943, SS-Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, Himmler’s chief of anti-partisan operations, had promised Governor General Frank that he would secure Globocnik’s removal; indeed, Himmler considered appointing Globocnik SSPF in Khar’kiv following the recapture of the city from the Soviets in March 1943. Though Frank had dismissed his old nemesis, District Governor Zörner, in March 1943, Globocnik failed to get on better with the new Governor, SS-Obergruppenführer Richard Wendler, who happened to be Himmler’s brother-in-law. On July 27, 1943, Wendler demanded that Himmler remove Globocnik from Lublin, complaining that his resettlement policies constituted a “spectacular failure […] so that one can only speak now of a pigsty as a result of the movement of populations back and forth.” Though he asked his brother-in-law to forgive Globocnik his “hasty and foolish acts” and to appreciate the “enormous energy and dynamic of this man, who is made for the colonization of the East like no other,” Himmler must have been relieved when the surrender of the Badoglio government in Italy on September 8, gave the Reich the opportunity to occupy and police northern Italy. On September 16, 1943, Himmler transferred Globocnik to Trieste as the Higher SS and Police Leader for the newly established “Operations Zone Adriatic Coast Land.” Though Globocnik had high hopes of pursuing his style of WVHA [signed Pohl], August 13, 1943, Appendix 3 to Globocnik to Himmler, January 5, 1944, NS 19/2234, p. 55, Bundesarchiv/Berlin, copy in RG-14.015M, AUSHMM.


156 Circular of RFSS and Chief of German Police [signed Winkelmann], March 31, 1943, O. Globocnik SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), A3343/SSO, 016A/1072-1073, NARA.

157 Wendler to Himmler, July 27, 1943, ibid., 1000-1002.

158 Himmler to Wendler, August 4, 1943, ibid., 1003.
of annihilation and settlement policy in Trieste and took some of his Operation Reinhard and SSPF Lublin staff with him, often without permission of the SS Personnel Main Office, his police forces were too weak, the position of the Wehrmacht too strong, and the partisan warfare too real to match his “accomplishment” in Lublin.159

Globocnik’s rise in the SS apparatus stemmed both from his absolute devotion to National Socialism and to Hitler and Himmler as its chief exponents and from his ruthless implementation of their wishes in regard to race and settlement in the planned German Empire in the East. This fanatical ideological commitment reflected a personal, psychological need to demonstrate that he belonged to the myth world that National Socialism offered to its adherents. Due perhaps in part to his by Nazi standards unorthodox ethnic origins and certainly fueled by the personal and legal difficulties conjured up by his unorthodox methods and his hot temper, this commitment was both recognized and cherished by Himmler and Hitler. Indeed, Hitler himself had always prized men, who, on their own initiative “perseveringly, tenaciously, but also – when necessary – ruthlessly perceived the interests of the Nation.”160 Globocnik undoubtedly took seriously his self-characterization as a Frontkämpfer from September 1, 1939.161

Globocnik could always support his rebellious independence by establishing a strong network of cronies and armed units firmly under his control from below along with tight relationships to the higher SS hierarchy. Only as Gauleiter in Vienna did he lack these tools and there he quickly paid the price. In occupied Poland, he sought first to use the ethnic German Selbstschutz as the muscle with which he could force his will despite personal rivals and other obstacles. The Selbstschutz was too small and its leaders too corrupt, even by Nazi standards, to


161 Race and Settlement Questionnaire, no date [internal evidence indicates 1944], O. Globocnik SS Officer file, RG-242 (former BDC), NARA.
sustain Globocnik’s independence. The civilian authorities were eventually able to force its dissolution and take over most of its personnel for deployment in the countryside in 1940–1941. With the Trawniki Training Camp and the seemingly inexhaustible supply of Soviet prisoners of war and civilians from Galicia prepared to serve the German Reich in its most murderous policy, Globocnik had that independent police base to help Himmler realize his dreadful vision for the occupied East. While German military reverses kept the SS and Police Bases largely on paper, the SSPF Lublin with its Trawniki-trained support succeeded sadly in annihilating Polish Jewry.